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An Empirical Analysis of Factors That Distinguish 
Those Who Evade on Their Tax Return from Those 
Who Choose not to File a Return 
Steven E. Crane ' and Farrokh Nourzad" 
Abstract 
This paper presents an empirical model distinguishing evaders who cheal by filing 
fra udulelll jncome tax relurnsfrom those who do nOlftle. Using a maximum-likelihood 
procedure that corrects for sample selection bias, and data from Michigan's amnesty 
program, we estimate a linear probability model which relates the probability oifi/jng 
to various economic and demographic characteristics. The results indicate that higher 
{rue income and ou/omaric withholding raise the probability o/filing, while males and 
single indil,iduaJs are less likely 10 file. The evidence regarding a grouping of occupa-
tiolls often thought to he associated with evasion is inconclusive. 
I. Introduction 
Income tax evasion is a widely recognized and growing problem that costs govern-
ments throughout the world a great deal of revenue. In the United States. the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) has estimated that the annual shortfall in income tax revenue due 
to evas ion exceeds $100 billion. A portion of this is by individuals who file fraudulent 
returns that underreport their true tax obligation. Another portion of the tax gap is 
attributable to the estimated 9.8 million who do nol fi le tax returns al all. 
In recent years we have learned a great deal from both theoretical and empirical 
analyses of a taxpayer' s decision to underreport his or her income (Cowell . 1990). In 
contrast, we know very little abou t nonfi lers. This is partly because data avai lability 
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problems are morc formidable: Iiltl e infomlalio n conccming nonfil ers can be produced 
because 11 0 records exist.1 In uddilion. there is liule theoreti cal guid<.tnce concerning lhis 
group. In conventional microlheorc lic evasion models nonfi lers represent comer solu-
tions thaI are c;s:;piicitly ruled OUI so thaI comparative stati cs analysis can be performed 
on interior solut ions that renee! underreporting. 
While fa nnal mode ls of non filers have only recently begun 10 appear in the 
Ulerature (e.g .. Yaniv . 1988). some progress can still be made at the empiri cal level. The 
growing popularity o f income lax amnes ty programs otTers an opportunity to address 
the data avai lab ility problem. The experience in the U.S. indicates that amnesty partic i. 
pants include not only income underrc portcrs but also non filers , many of whom were 
not otherwise known to the lax authoriti es. This means that, in principle, one can use 
data generated from amnesty programs to study tax evasion by underreportcrs and 
non filers. 
In practice. however, one is faced with certain limitations and complications. 
Because many amnesty programs are has tily put together with little advanced planning 
fo r subsequent research, the data are often limited in tenns o f both quality and quantity. 
Moreover, special econometric procedures are needed to deal with the complications 
caused by the self-selected nature of amnesty data. 
Elsewhere, we have studied the problem of income tax evasion at the indiv idual 
level using data from tax amnesty programs offered by Cali fornia and Michigan (Crane 
and Nourzad, 1990, 1992). Both sl.udies focused on testing certain comparative statics 
propositions derived from microtheoretic mode ls of income tax evasion. Because of 
thi s, we concentrated exclusive ly on partkipants who were amending their original 
re turns under amnesty. In other words, we discarded the observations on individuals 
who had not filed an orig inal return but came forth under amnesty and vol ulllaril y 
provided infonnation about their status for the year in question. Since nonfilers made up 
the majority of the samples. our prev ious work did not fully ex ploit the infonnalion 
available from these amnesty programs. 
In the present paper we use a sample of both types of participants in lIle Michigan 
tax amnesty program to identify certain economic and demographic factors that disti n· 
guish non file rs from underreporters. The results provide infomlation regarding how 
these characteristics affectlhe probabi lity that an evader chooses to be a nonfiler rather 
than an income underreporter. This in fomtation may be useful for developing a profile 
of those who opt to remain outside the tax system. and for designing polic ies to ind uce 
these indi viduals to enter the system. 
Of course. thi s information still represents only an add itional piece of the overall 
tax evasion puzzle. A tru ly comple te analysis wou ld require an extremely ri ch data SCI, 
one that wou ld include not only informati on about the cheaters exami ned in this paper. 
but a lso comple tely honest taxpayers. With such data, one could examine me sequentia l 
process from the initi al decision to cheat or nOl. through me decis ion regarding me fonn 
of cheating (Le., not filing vs. filing a fraudulen t return). Unfortunately , a data set of this 
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richness has never been assembled, and it is unlikely that it ever will be, since it would 
require a highly improbable level of cooperation (and honesty) from aJl groups.2 
In lhe absence of this ideal data set, researchers must be content to focus on one or 
more pieces of the puzzle. Most research has focused on samples such as those from the 
.IRS Tax Compliance Measurement Program. which allow one to di stinguish between 
"honest" and dishonest filers, but contain no information on the Doofiling population. 
OUf work uses a sample of lax amnesty data on dishonest individuals that allows us to 
examine the nalure of the dishonesty. By combining the information that emerges from 
these separate approaches, analysts should be able to move closer to tiUing in the 
complete tax compliance picture. 
The organization of the paper is as follows: In the next section we describe some 
econometric issues concerning the use of amnesty data for analyzing tax evasion. In 
section [1]. we describe our empirical model. In section IV, we present and di scuss our 
estimation results. The paper ends with a section summarizing thi s work and di scussing 
some policy implications. 
II. The Econometrics of Analyzing Tax Amnesty Data 
Analyzing evasion using amnesty data calls for special econometric procedures to 
deal with the potential bias caused by the self-selected nature of the sample . This 
requires modeling not only the initial decision to evade, but al so the subsequent deci sion 
to participate in the amnesty program. 
The Filing Decision 
The evader's decision regarding the form his or her evasion will take can be 
modeled as follows. Let Yi = I if the ith individual evades by filing a lax return that 
underreports his or her true taxable income and Yj = 0 if he or she is a nonfiler. Denote 
by Xi the vector of the factors that affect the individual' s decision to file or not and let B 
be a vector of unknown parameters. Suppose the probability that Y; = I is F (Xi, P ), in 
which case Prob (Yi = 0) = I - F (Xi, P ). For estimation purposes, the main question is 
how to specify F (Xi, P ). U we assume F (Xi. Il ) = Xi p, we have the linear probability 
model (LPM), 
( I ) Y;= X; ~ + u; 
where "i is a random error tenn with mean 0 and variance cr. On the other hand. if we 
let F (Xi. P ) be the cumulative standard nonnal (logistic) distribution function. we have 
the probit (Iogit) model. 
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Our task would be quite easy if we had a truly random sample. Most standard 
econometrics programs have buill-in routi nes fo r estimating these disc rete choice mod-
el s. A sample of amnesty panicipanls, however. is not ent irely random because amnesty 
filers themselves decided to be in the program. As a result , the parameter est imates from 
any of the above models are likely to suffer from bias unless the participation decision 
is incorporated into the model. 
The Parficiplllion Decision 
In many applications. correcting for self-selection bias can be accompli shed by 
using the two-step procedure developed by Heckman (1979). In this approach the 
participation decision equation is expressed as, 
(2) t; = Z,y - E, 
where r, is a latent variable which represents the propensity to partIcIpate m the 
program, Zi is the vector of factors affecting the participation decision. y is a vector of 
unknown parameters, and ti is a random error tenn with mean zero and variance 1. 
Since t; is unobservable. the standard procedure is to defi ne 'i = I if and only if t; > 0 
and ,; = 0 otherwise, and to use it as the left-hand-side variable in equation (2). In the 
first step of the Heckman procedure, equation (2) is est imated by probiL Using the 
resulting estimated parameters, a correction factor (the Inverse Mills Ratio) is con-
structed and used in lhe second step as an additional regressor in the base model, 
equation ( I ). 
The type of sample se lection that is assoc iated with amnesty data is a spec ial case 
that cannot be treated by thi s method. The prob lem is that amnesty samples are 
truncated in that we only observe those who participate in the programs and have no 
informat'ion on those who do not ; that is, we observe Yi • Xi. and Zi onl y if , ; = I . We 
cannot use the Heckman two-step procedure since in the firsl step the parameter vector 
of the participation function. y. cannot be estimated. An alternat ive sample-selection 
correction procedure for incorporating the participat ion decision is needed for amnesty 
samples. 
Correcting/or Sample-Selection Bias ill Amnesty Dtlla 
Bloom and Killingsworth (1985). Maddala ( 1983). and Muthen and Joreskog 
(1983) have developed procedures that can be used for correct ing se lf-select ion bias in 
truncated samples. In contrast to Heckman's Iwo-step approach. theirs is a one-step 
estimation procedure which involves maximizing a likelihood function Ihat integrates 
informalion about the base deci sion of interest and the related deci sion to participate. 
110 AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF TAX EVASION FACTORS 
This procedure, which assumes the base deci sion is modeled as a conventional linear 
regression, can be used here provided the filing decision is specified as the LPM shown 
in equation (I). On the other hand. if the base decision is spec ified as a probil (Iogit) 
model, then the issue is more complicated. 
In this paper we report results using a linear probability model for the fi ling 
decision while correcting for self·selection bias using the one-step approach mentioned 
above. This involves maximizing the likelihood function, 
(3) n ,[<I> (2,1) rl ( 1/ cr) exp [- (112 cr' )(Y, - Xi ~)' J 
• <I> It 2,1- (p/ cr )(Y,-X, P)]lt (I - p' il2 )) 
where <P (.) is the cumulative distribution function and p is the correlati on coefficient 
between U j and Ej, the error terms in the fi ll ing decision equation ( I) and the partic i pa~ 
tion equation (2), respecti vely. All other notations are as defined previously. 
Maximizing (3) addresses the se lf-se lection issue as follows. The fact that nonpar~ 
ticipants are not represented in the sample means that a portion of the overall di stribu-
tion is missing. As a result. standard estimation procedures produce coefficients whose 
means are nol centered on the true parameter value. Further, the missing portion of the 
distribution means that the area under the density function does not sum to one, thereby 
invalidating the usual hypothesis tests. Equation (3) "correc ts" for these problems by 
incorporating infonnat ion about the deci sion to participate, and using it to re-scale the 
distribution for participants. This re-scaling re-centers the estimators, and assures that 
the area under the distribution curve sums to one. 
In addition to correcting for the sample-selection bias, thi s maximum-likelihood 
procedure has the advantage that the resulting in verse Hessian matrix yields correct 
asymptotic standard errors. Thus, we avoid the problem caused by heteroscedasticity 
when the model implied by (3 ) is estimated by nonlinear least squares. 
111. The Empirical Model 
In this section we specify an empirical model fo r analyzing the effect of various 
socia-economic fac tors on an evader's choice between filing a fraudulent tax return and 
not filing. We begin by describing the data used in the analysis. Next. we present our 
empi rical coun terpart of the filing dec ision equation ( I) followed by that of the partici-
pation decision equation (2). 
The Sample 
The data used in thi s study are taken from the tax amnesty database constructed by 
the Michigan Treasury Department.3 The ori ginal data set contai ned infonnation taken 
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from 4.203 returns. 2.985 of which pertained to individual income laKes. Of these, 588 
were fil ed by individuals who were amending a relurn and 2.397 were by individuals 
who had nOI filed previously fo r the year in question . 
The sample used in the present study is a subset of the individual income lax 
amnesty returns. It consists o f 1.748 returns filed under amnesty. or these. 213 amended 
a return and J .535 were "new" returns by indiv iduals who had not filed previously for 
the year in question. This subsample is the result of an extensive data evaluation/verifi-
cation process in which data were checked for internal consistency. missing observa-
tions. and the like. 
Factors Affecting ,he Filing Decision 
Given the limited theoretical gu idance concerning lhe fi le/no-file decision. our 
specification of the filling decision is based largely on intuition and data availability. 
We use a num ber of variables as potential discriminants between underreporters and 
nonfilers. One such variable is the individual' s true income. For this we use adjusted 
gross income as reponed on the amended retum.4 We also control for differences in the 
opportunity to evade. First. we account fo r the impact of automat.ic tax withholding. 
Second, we identify individuals with certain occupations that are suspected to have 
higher opponunities to evade, We also dislinguish between the two groups of evaders 
based on two demographic characteristics. gender and marital status. 
We speci fy our empirical version of equation ( I) as follows, 
r ,= Ilo+ ~ , AGJ, + j}, IVrrHHEW,+ ~3 OCCUPATN,+ 
(4) ~,MALE,+~s MARRJED,+ II, 
where Y; is a dummy variable thal equals I if the individual is an income underreporter 
and 0 if he or she is a nonfiler: AGI is the individual' s true adj usted gross income; 
WITHHELD is a dununy vari able that is I if any income had been withheld and 0 
otherwise : OCCUPATN is a dummy variable whk h equals I if the individual 's occupa-
tion is one or more of the following: self-employed, saJes, fann ing. foods and bever-
ages. construction. and personal services: MALE is a dummy variable lhat takes the 
value I if the individual is male and 0 olherwise; and MARR/ED is a dummy variable 
identi fy ing married individuals. 
FaClors Affectillg (he Panicipatioll Decision 
In specifying our empirical version of the participation decision equation (2), we 
draw on the recent work by Aim and Beck (199 1) and by Fisher, Goddeeris, and Young 
(1989). They emphasize the importance of perceplions about increases in penaJty and 
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the detection probabi lity that occur after amnesty . We postulate that the perceived 
increase in the detecti on probab il ity post-amnesty is related to expec tations regarding 
the subsequent enforcement regime. 
We contro l fo r this factor in three ways. First. we identify certain types of income 
that are more likely 10 attract attention. Second, we make use of the facl that Lhe 
Michigan Department of Treasury planned to target the returns of professionals who 
were licensed by the Slale. Th ird. we identify the returns of evaders who might have 
feared they had been uncovered either through IRS audits or the Michigan Treasury 
Department documenlmatching programs. 
We complete our specification of the partic ipation function by controlli ng for a 
nonpecuniary inOuence (Fisher, Goddeeris and Young, 1989). We identi fy the mnnesty 
retu rns that were accompanied by a special letler of explanation from the individual 
concerning hi s or her filing for amnesty. Given that the amnesty provisions required no 
such explanat ion, thi s leiter might indicate that the individual felt some degree of guilt 
or remorse. 
We thus specify the following participation decis ion equation, 
r, = Yo + Y, RENTROYL, + y, LICENSED, + y, lRSAUDIT, + 
(5) Y4 LE7TER, + y, GUILT, - E, 
where t; is the latent variable representing the propensity 10 participate in the amneslY 
program: RENTROYL is a dummy variable that equals I if the individual' s income 
includes rents. royalties. or business income: LICENSED is a dummy variable thai 
ind icates whether the individual is licensed by the state for practice in one or more of the 
follow ing fie lds: architecture, medicineihealLh, law, personal serv ices, and transport-
ation: IRSAUDIT is a dummy variab le that is equal to I if the participant was under 
audit by the IRS prior to or during the amnesty program: LE7TER is a dummy variable 
that takes the value I if the individual was sent a letter by the Michigan Department of 
Treasury inquiring why he or she had filed a federa l return but had fai led to fi le a sta te 
return ; and CUILTis a dummy variable indicating returns fi led under amnesty that were 
accompanied by a le iter of explanation. 
RecaJlthat the filing decision equation (4) and the participation equation (5) are not 
estimated separately; they are integrated into the likel ihood function (3) which is then 
maximized. This yields unbiased estimates for ps in equation (4), but the estimates ofy.;. 
in equation (5) are unreliable (MaddaJa, 1983). In Ijghl of thi s. we focus exclusively on 
the parameters of the filing equation. 
While the sign of the income coefficient ultimately depends upon risk attitudes, 
intuition suggests one might expect a positive coefficien t. As one's income rises. it 
becomes increas ingly difficult to avoid leav ing trails for the tax authorities to fo llow. 
Moreover. opportunjti es to engage in legal tax avoidance increase with income. There-
fore, as income ri ses those who decide to evade are more li ke ly to do so on the return 
rather than by not filing. Along the same lines, we expect the withholding variable 10 
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have a posi tive coefficient. This caprures the fact thai the individual was known to the 
authorities as hav ing earned income that mig ht be taxable. 
Turning to the occupation variable. it is difficult to fonn a clear-cut sign expecta-
tio n. Although it is generally agreed thai people in these occupations have morc 
opportunities to evade, there is no consensus as to what Conn their evasion takes. Some 
of these occupations may provide the opponunity not to file at all . whereas others offer 
the individual various ways to misstate differen t items on his or her return. This 
uncertaint y is compounded by the fac t that the model already cOnlains the wi thholding 
variable which panially control s for the opportunity nOI 10 fi le. Thus OCCUPATN 
captures only the effect of the incremental opponunity nOl to file, above and beyond thai 
avai lab le in Ihe absence of automatic wi thho lding. 
As for the marital status variable. we expect it to have a posi tive coefficient because 
it is more like ly that two people leave traceable impact in the economy. Finally. we have 
no sign expectation on the gender variable. 
IV. Estimation Results 
The max imum-likelihood (ML) resuhs are reponed in Table l. For comparison 
purposes. we ha ve also incl uded resuhs from estimating the filing decis ion model by 
ordinary least squares (OLS) which does not correct for sample se lection. 
Table I 
ML Estimates· aLS Eslim:ues" 
Codf ,· Ral p-Val Coeff I-Rat p-Val 
CONSTANT I 0.843 2.526 0.012 0.035 2.095 0.036 
AG I 0.0 13 1.726 0.084 0.035 4 .738 0.000 
WITHH ELD 0.1 16 5..l95 0.000 0.157 10.324 0.000 
OCCUPATN -0.021 · 1.014 0.3 11 ·0.008 ·0.393 0.694 
MALE ·0.055 -2.832 0.005 -oms -4.250 0.000 
MARRIED 0.059 3.625 0.000 0.074 3.953 0.001 
CONSTANT2 -4.426 - 1.528 0.126 
RENTROYL 5.273 0.438 0.662 
LICENSED " .003 ..0.028 0.978 
IRSAUDIT 5.043 0.852 0.394 
Ll::TrER ·0.424 - 1.084 0.278 
GUILT 1.235 1.276 0.202 
a 0.3 \7 4.116 0.000 
P -0.566 - 1.807 0.Q71 
LOGLKUIOOD · 149.650 -397.039 
• With sample-selection correction. 
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Consider first the ML results, The estimated coefficient of the income variable is 
positive and significant althe 8% level. s This indicates thai evaders are more likely to 
file as true income increases. wh ich suggests thm nonfilers are morc like ly \0 be low 
income individuals.6 The estimated coefficient of the withholding dummy variable is 
pos itive and highly significant. implying that the probabili ty thai an evader is a Ilonfiler 
decreases if the individuaJ is subjecllo with ho lding. 
Turning 10 the occupation variable. we observe that its estimated coefficient is 
negative. although not stati stically s ignificant at conventional levels. It may be that the 
occupatio nal grouping used to construct this variable is 100 broad. Or it may be thallhe 
opposing effects mentioned earlier cance l each other out On the other hand , after 
con trolling for the effect of withho lding, there may be little incremental opportunity not 
to file associated with these occupations. In fact, when the model was rc-estimated 
without WITHHELD, the estimated coefficient of OCCUPATN remained negative but 
became highly stati stically significant. 
Finally, consider lhe two demographic variables. BOIh have statistica lly significant 
effects on the prohahil.ity of fil ing. Males are more likely to be nonfil ers. whereas 
married individua ls are more like ly 10 evade by filing fraud ulen t returns. 
We conclude our discussion o f the ML resull s by noting that the esti mated standard 
error of the filing equation , cr, and the estimated correlation coefficien t betwcen the 
error tenns, p. are both statistically significan t al reasonable leve ls. The laller result is 
of particular interest because it suggests that our attempt [0 model the panicipation 
decis ion has met with some success. We can get a sense of the impact of the se lection 
bias on the estimated parameters of the filing decision equation by comparing the ML 
estimates with the OLS result s. 
This comparison indicates that the two sets of results are similar in tenns of s igns 
and significance.1 As far as magni tudes of these estimates are concerned. the mos t 
notable difference is the coefficient o f income. The ML estimate o f this parameter is 
considerably smaller (han its OLS counterpart, both in absolute tenns and relative to the 
other stati stically s igni ficant parameters. This may be important for developing an 
accurate profile o f nonfilers. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
In thi s paper we demonstrated how amnesty data can be used to study tax evasion. 
Using data from the amnesty program by the slate of Michigan , we specified and 
estimated a model that examined the effect of economic and demographic factors on 
probabili ty of filing a fraudulent income tax return versus not filing at ai L In doing so, 
we employed a max imum li ke lihood procedure that corrects fo r the sample selection 
bias in the data. 
We lind that there is a positive correlation between the leve l of income and the 
probabil ity of fi ling. An implication of thi s is that, despite the large number of nonfilcrs 
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in the population at large, the potential return to compl iance efforts directed toward 
these individuals may be limited. However, if for reasons other than revenue generati on 
it is des irable 10 bring nonfilers into the lax system, then au tomatic withhold ing appears 
to be an effect ive enforcement tool. This is suggested by the very strong positi ve 
correlation that we find between withholdi ng and !.he probability of filing. 
In contrast. we are unable to establ ish a link between nonfiling and a grouping of 
occupatio ns oflen tho ught to be associated with evasion. Thus targeting these occupa-
tions as a way of reducing nonfili ng behavior may not be an effecti ve compliance 
policy. Perhaps being subjecllo automatic tax withholding constrains the opportunity to 
be a nonfil er which typi cally provides the rationale for targeting these occupations. In 
fact, gender or maritaJ status appears to be a better d iscriminant of non filing than 
occupation since we find that maJes and single individuals are more likely Lo be 
nonfilers. 
The analysis reported in this paper can be extended and improved in several ways. 
First. given the weak perfonnance of the occupation variable. it would be wise to 
re-examine this issue using more detailed occupational groupings. Second , in order to 
gain ins igln into poss ible differences between the behav ior of repeated and single-year 
evaders, control shou ld be made for the returns of multiple-year amnesty fi lers. A third , 
yet related. issue is that there are two types of nonfilers: those for whom there is some 
previous record and those for whom no such record exists. Distingui shing between 
these two groups may be relevant for both the base equation and the partic ipation 
equation. Fourth, we have paid no attention to characteristics of the returns themselves. 
It may be that the degree of complexity of the individuar s return has some impact on 
the file/no file decision. Finally. experimentation with alternative econometric ap-
proaches to estimating the base equation should be undertaken. Estimation using probit, 
logit. or perhaps even a lobi t speci fication should provide an indication of the robust-
ness of the estimates. 
Noles 
t. Data pertaining 10 income undcrreponers can be generaled from a number o f sources including special 
audi t programs such as the IRS Tax Compliance Measurement Program. TeMP. 
2. Without complete honeslY. il would be \'cry difficu[tlO distingu ish honest filers from dishonest ones. 
At best, ~honest " wou ld be defined as those who successfully wilhslood a comprehensive audit , which slill 
misses the most sophisticated evaders. W ithout full honesty. it would be vcry difficul t 10 identifycv!KIers who 
are nonfi lers. At best some of Ihe nonfilers could be identified through a massive eITon to follow any "l.IOCes" 
these indi viduals mi~ht have left in the tux system (c.g .. a previous return. wilhholding. elc.). while missi ng 
the nonfilers who had left no traces to fo llow. 
3. The program. whic h lasted from May [2 through June 300f 1986. covered all fonns of state tax~s. Fo r 
more on the Michigan amnesty program see Bowman and Manin (1987. [988) and Fisher. Goddeens, and 
Young ( t989). . 
4 . ln us ingamneslY data. our assumption is that the relurn filed under amnesly IS fi lled out truthfully. 
5 . Prior 10 estimation the income variable was standaTdized in o rder to improve the convergence 
propertIes o f the model. 
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6. In facl, in our sample the mean value of AGI for the non filers is $20.842, whereas that of the 
underreporters is $52.93 1. 
7. We also eSlimaied the fili ng decision equation by probit and obtained resulls which were virtually 
identical quali tatively \0 the OLS results. 
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